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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a verification case study on an autonomous
racing car with a neural network (NN) controller. Although several
verification approaches have been recently proposed, they have
only been evaluated on low-dimensional systems or systems with
constrained environments. To explore the limits of existing approaches, we present a challenging benchmark in which the NN
takes raw LiDAR measurements as input and outputs steering for
the car. We train a dozen NNs using reinforcement learning (RL)
and show that the state of the art in verification can handle systems
with around 40 LiDAR rays. Furthermore, we perform real experiments to investigate the benefits and limitations of verification with
respect to the sim2real gap, i.e., the difference between a system’s
modeled and real performance. We identify cases, similar to the
modeled environment, in which verification is strongly correlated
with safe behavior. Finally, we illustrate LiDAR fault patterns that
can be used to develop robust and safe RL algorithms.

CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Formal methods; • Computing methodologies → Neural networks; • Computer systems organization → Robotic autonomy.

KEYWORDS
Neural Network Verification, Learning for Control, F1/10 Racing
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INTRODUCTION

Neural networks (NNs) have shown great promise in multiple application domains, including safety-critical systems such as autonomous driving [5] and air traffic collision avoidance systems [16].
At the same time, widespread adoption of NN-based autonomous
systems is hindered by the fact that NNs often fail in seemingly
unpredictable ways: slight perturbations in their inputs can result
in drastically different outputs, as is the case with adversarial examples [27]. Such issues might lead to fatal outcomes in safety-critical
systems [4] and thus underscore the need to assure the safety of
NN-based systems before they can be deployed at scale.
One way to reason about such systems is to formally verify safety
properties of a NN’s outputs for certain sensitive inputs, as proposed
in several NN verification and robustness works [10, 11, 17, 29, 30].
This material is based upon work supported by the Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under Contract
No. FA8750-18-C-0090. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations
expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the AFRL, DARPA, the Department of Defense, or the United States
Government.

However, safety of the NN does not immediately imply safety of
the entire autonomous system. A more exhaustive approach is to
consider the interaction between the NN and the physical plant
(e.g., a car), trace the evolution of the plant’s states (e.g., position,
velocity) and ensure all reachable states are safe. A few such methods were developed to verify safety of autonomous systems with
NN controllers [9, 15, 26, 28]. These techniques combine ideas from
classical dynamical system reachability [7, 18, 28] (e.g., view the
NN as a hybrid system) with NN verification approaches (e.g., transform the NN into a mixed integer linear program). However, these
approaches have so far been evaluated on fairly simple systems: either systems with low-dimensional NN inputs (i.e., the plant states
such as position and velocity [9, 15, 28]) or with constrained environments (e.g., LiDAR orientation does not change over time [26]).
Two main challenges remain in verifying realistic systems. The
first one is scalability, with respect to (w.r.t) both plant dynamics
and NN complexity. Since reachability is undecidable for general
hybrid systems [3], existing approaches can only approximate the
reachable sets. The NN adds complexity not only due to size but also
due to the number of inputs to the NN – it is much more challenging
to compute reachable sets for multivariate functions, even for small
NNs. Having the capability to verify high-dimensional systems is
crucial, however, since NNs are most useful exactly in such settings.
The second verification challenge is the sim2real gap, i.e., the
difference between a system’s modeled and real performance [6].
Analyzing the sim2real gap is essential as it allows us to explore
the benefit of verification w.r.t. the real system. Overcoming this
challenge would enable developers to design and test approaches
in simulation with the assurance that safety properties that hold in
simulation would carry over to the real world.
In order to illustrate these difficulties and to provide a challenging benchmark for future work, this paper presents a verification
case study on a realistic NN-controlled autonomous system. In particular, we focus on the F1/10 autonomous racing car [1], which
needs to navigate a structured environment using high-dimensional
LiDAR measurements. This case study has two goals: 1) assess the
capabilities of existing verification approaches and highlight aspects
that require future work; 2) investigate conditions under which the
verification translates to safe performance in the real world.
To perform the verification, we first identify a dynamics model of
the car, as well as an observation model mapping the car state to the
LiDAR measurements. To obtain the observation model, we assume
the car operates in a structured environment (i.e., a sequence of
hallways) such that each LiDAR ray can be calculated based on the
car’s state and the surrounding walls. Given these models, we train
an end-to-end NN controller using reinforcement learning (RL) [20].
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Figure 2: Overview of the closed-loop system and the problem considered in this paper.
Figure 1: Navigation scenario. There are three regions depending on how many walls can be reached by LiDAR.
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2.1
The NN takes LiDAR measurements as input and produces steering
as output (assuming constant throttle). Once the NN is trained, we
aim to verify that the car does not crash in the hallway walls.
We evaluate the scalability of existing verification tools by varying the NN size, the number of LiDAR rays as well as the training
algorithm. Note that the complexity of verification grows exponentially with the number of rays since, depending on the uncertainty,
a ray could reach different walls, which correspond to different
paths in the hybrid observation model – all such paths need to be
verified simultaneously. We use the state-of-the-art tool Verisig [15]
to verify the dozen setups that were trained; we could not encode
the LiDAR model in the other existing tools. In our evaluation,
Verisig could handle NNs containing two layers with 128 neurons
each and LiDAR scans with around 40 rays. This highlights the
challenge presented by this case study: verifying a full LiDAR scan
with 1081 rays, together with a corresponding NN that can process
such a scan, remains beyond the capabilities of existing tools.
Finally, we perform experiments, using the verified controllers,
to evaluate the system’s sim2real gap. This gap is especially pronounced with LiDAR, since laser rays could provide an erroneous
distance if they are reflected. We first perform experiments in an
ideal setting with all reflective surfaces covered – all NNs performed
similarly in this setup, resulting in safe behavior roughly 90% of
the time, where the crashes were still caused by LiDAR faults that
could not be completely eliminated. More crashes were observed in
the unmodified environment, as caused by consistently bad LiDAR
data. Interestingly, we identified patterns of LiDAR faults that reproduce the unsafe behavior in simulations as well – however, training
(and verifying) a robust controller is left for future work, since
state-of-the-art RL algorithms cannot easily handle these faults.
This paper has three contributions: 1) a challenging benchmark
for verification and RL in NN-controlled autonomous systems with
high-dimensional measurements; 2) an exhaustive evaluation of a
state-of-the-art verification tool; 3) real experiments that illustrate
the benefits and limitations of verification w.r.t. the sim2real gap.

SYSTEM OVERVIEW

This section summarizes the different parts of the F1/10 case study.
We first describe the F1/10 platform, followed by a high-level introduction to reinforcement learning and hybrid system verification.

The F1/10 Autonomous Racing Car

The case study considered in this paper is inspired by the F1/10
Autonomous Racing Competition [1], where an autonomous car
must navigate a structured environment (i.e., the track) as fast as
possible. The F1/10 car is shown in Figure 1. It is built for racing
purposes and can reach up to 40mph. The car is controlled by an
onboard chip such as the NVIDIA Jetson TX2 module.
A diagram of the closed-loop system is shown in Figure 2. The car
operates in a hallway environment; without loss of generality, we
assume all turns are 90-degree right turns such that the “track” is a
square. Although in the competition the car has access to a number
of sensors, in this case study the controller only has access to LiDAR
measurements. The measurements are sent to a NN controller that
outputs a steering command to the vehicle. We assume that the
car operates at constant throttle, in order to keep the dynamics
model and the verification task manageable. The car’s dynamic and
observation models are described in Section 3.

2.2

Reinforcement Learning

Overall, developing a robust controller for the F1/10 car is a challenging task, both due to the difficulty of analyzing LiDAR measurements and to the speed and agility of the car. Thus, this is a good
application for RL [20], where no knowledge of the car dynamics or
the observation model is required. During training, the controller
applies a control action and observes a reward. As training proceeds, the problem is to maximize the reward by exploring the state
space and trying different controls. In recent years, deep RL (where
controllers are NNs) has shown great promise in a number of traditionally challenging problems, such as playing Atari games [21],
controlling autonomous cars [5] and playing board games [25].
Hence, RL is a natural choice for learning a controller for the F1/10
car as well; the specific training approach is described in Section 4.

2.3

Hybrid System and NN Verification

At a high level, the hybrid system verification problem is as follows:
given a hybrid model of the plant dynamics and observations, the
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problem is to compute the set of reachable plant states over time
(for a set of initial conditions) and verify that no unsafe states can
be reached. Although hybrid system reachability is undecidable
except for linear systems [3, 19] (see [2, 8] for a discussion), several
approaches work well for specific non-linear systems. In particular,
reachability is δ -decidable for Type 2 computable functions [18],
which has led to the development of the tool dReach. Alternatively,
Flow* [7] constructs Taylor model (TM) approximations of the
reachable sets. While Flow* provides no decidability claims, it can
verify interesting properties for multiple non-linear systems classes
and scales well when using TMs with interval analysis.
Recently, several approaches were developed for verification of
hybrid systems with NNs controllers [9, 15, 26, 28]. As described in
Section 1, the NN introduces new challenges both due to its size
and complexity. To address this issue, the proposed approaches
borrow ideas from classical hybrid system reachability, e.g., transform the NN into a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) [9], a
satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) formula [26] or an equivalent
hybrid system [15]. Although existing tools have shown promising scalability in terms of the size of the NN, they have only been
evaluated on low-dimensional systems or systems with constrained
environments. This paper provides a more challenging scenario,
with a high-dimensional hybrid observation model, in order to test
the limits of these tools and to highlight avenues for future work.

2.4

System Design and Development

In order to build and verify the system, we perform the following
steps: 1) model the car dynamics and observations; 2) train a NN on
the model using RL; 3) verify that the NN-controlled car is safe w.r.t.
the model; 4) perform real experiments to analyze the sim2real gap.
The following sections describe each of these steps in more detail.

3

PLANT MODEL

throttle input, and δ is the heading input; c a is an acceleration
constant, cm is a car motor constant, ch is a hysteresis constant,
and l f and lr are the distances from the car’s center of mass to
the front and rear, respectively. Since tan−1 is not supported by
most hybrid system verification tools, we assume that β = 0; this is
not a limiting assumption as the slip angle is typically fairly small
at low speeds; we did not observe significant differences in the
model’s predictive power due to this assumption. After performing
system identification, we obtained the following parameter values:
c a = 1.633, cm = 0.2, ch = 4, l f = 0.225m, lr = 0.225m. Finally, we
assume a constant throttle u = 16 (resulting in a top speed of
roughly 2.4 m/s), i.e., the controller only controls heading. We
emphasize that the plant model is fairly non-linear, thus making it
difficult to compute reachable sets for the car’s states.

3.2
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yk = 








Dynamics model

We use a bicycle model [22, 23] to model the car’s dynamics, which
is a standard model for cars with front steering. Specifically, we
use a kinematic bicycle model since it has few parameters (that
are easy to identify) and tracks reasonably well at low speeds, i.e.,
under 5 m/s [23]. In the kinematic bicycle model, the car has four
states: position in two dimensions, linear velocity and heading. The
continuous-time dynamics are given by the following equations:
ẋ = vcos (θ + β )
v̇ = −c a v + c a cm (u − ch )
V cos (β )
θ˙ =
tan(δ )
l f + lr

(1)

lr tan(δ ) +
β = tan−1 *
,
, l f + lr where v is the car’s linear velocity, θ is the car’s orientation, β
is the car’s slip angle and x and y are the car’s position; u is the

dkr /cos (90 + θ k + α i )
dkb /cos (180 + θ k + α i )
dkt /cos (θ k + α i )
dkl /cos (90 − θ k − α i )

if θ k + α i ≤ θ r
if θ r < θ k + α i ≤ −90
if − 90 < θ k + α i ≤ θl
if θl < θ k + α i ,

(2)

where k is the sampling step (the sampling rate is 10Hz), dkt , dkb , dkl , dkr
are distances to the four walls, as illustrated in Figure 1, and can be
derived from the car’s position (x, y). Note that computing reachable sets for the observation model is challenging since if a ray
is almost parallel to a wall, small uncertainty in the car’s heading
results in large uncertainty in the distance travelled by that ray, as
is evident in the division by cosine in the measurement model.

4

ẏ = vsin(θ + β )

Observation model

The F1/10 car has access to LiDAR measurements only. As shown
in Figure 1, a typical LiDAR scan consists of a number of rays
emanating from -135 to 135 degrees relative to the car’s heading.
For each ray, the car receives the distance to the first obstacle the
ray hits; if there are no obstacles within the LiDAR range, the car
receives the maximum range. In this case study, we consider a
LiDAR scan with a maximum of 1081 rays and a range of 5 meters.1
As shown in Figure 1, there are three regions the car can be
in, depending on how many walls can be reached using LiDAR.
We present the measurement model for Region 2 only since the
other regions are special cases of Region 2. Let α 1 , . . . , α 1081 denote
the relative angles for each ray with respect to the car’s heading,
i.e., α 1 = −135, α 2 = −134.75, . . . , α 1081 = 135. One can determine
which wall each LiDAR ray hits by comparing the α i for that ray
with the relative angles to the two corners of that turn, θl and θ r
in Figure 1. The measurement model for Region 2 (for a right turn)
is presented below, for i ∈ {1, . . . , 1081}:

This section describes the F1/10 car’s dynamical and observation
models. These models are used to train the NN controller (Section 4)
and to perform the closed-loop system verification (Section 5).

3.1

HSCC ’20, April 22–24, 2020, Sydney, NSW, Australia

CONTROLLER TRAINING

As mentioned in Section 2, the F1/10 case study is a good application
domain for deep reinforcement learning (DRL) due to the highdimensional measurements as well as the non-trivial control policy
that is required. This section discusses the DRL algorithms used in
the case study as well as the choice of reward function.
Multiple DRL algorithms have been proposed, depending on the
learning setup. For discrete control actions, the standard approach
1 Although

typical LiDARs have a longer range than 5m, we found our unit’s measurements to be unreliable beyond 5m.
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DRL algorithm NN setup # LiDAR rays Controller index Initial interval size NN ver. time (s) Total ver. time (s) # paths
DDPG
64 × 64
21
1
0.2cm
355
4126
1.32
DDPG
64 × 64
21
2
0.5cm
437
5652
1.975
DDPG
64 × 64
21
3
DNF
DDPG
128 × 128
21
1
0.2cm
2929
16758
2.13
DDPG
128 × 128
21
2
0.2cm
2744
16308
1.48
DDPG
128 × 128
21
3
DNF
TD3
64 × 64
21
1
0.5cm
553
4731
2.2
TD3
64 × 64
21
2
0.5cm
853
8094
2.75
TD3
64 × 64
21
3
0.5cm
724
8641
2.725
TD3
128 × 128
21
1
0.5cm
4336
22994
3.025
TD3
128 × 128
21
2
0.5cm
4059
21173
2.9
TD3
128 × 128
21
3
0.5cm
2689
13573
1.775
TD3
64 × 64
41
1
0.2cm*
634
11915
2.102
TD3
128 × 128
41
1
DNF
TD3
64 × 64
61
1
DNF
TD3
128 × 128
61
1
DNF
Table 1: Verification evaluation for different NN architectures and number of LiDAR rays. The verification times and the
number of paths are averaged over all subsets for each setup. Subset sizes are decreased from 0.5cm to 0.2cm and to 0.1cm,
if verification fails. DNF setups were terminated after 10 hours on 0.1cm subsets. The notation n × n means the NN has two
hidden layers and n neurons per layer. Two out of 100 instances of the 41-ray setup were killed after 24 hours.
is to use a deep Q-network [21] in order to learn the (Q) function
that maps a state and an action to the maximum expected reward
over a horizon. In the case of continuous actions, a deep deterministic policy gradient (DDPG) approach [20] was developed that
approximates the Q function using a Bellman equation. Notably,
DDPG uses two NNs, a critic that learns the Q function and an actor
that applies the controls. Once training is finished, the actor is used
as the actual controller. Multiple improvements over DDPG have
been proposed, especially in terms of training stability, e.g., using
normalized advanced functions (NAFs) [14], which are a continuous version of Q functions, or using a twin delayed DDPG (TD3)
algorithm [13] that employs two critics for greater stability. Finally,
model-based DRL algorithms have also been proposed where the
NN architecture is designed so as to learn the plant model [12].
In this paper, we focus on the continuous-action-space algorithms as they fit better the F1/10 car control task. For better evaluation, we train controllers using two different algorithms, namely
DDPG and TD3 (we could not train good controllers using the
authors’ implementation of the NAF-based approach).2
An important consideration in any DRL problem is the choice
of reward function. In particular, we are interested in a reward
function that not only results in better training but also in “smooth”
control policies that are easier to verify. Thus, the reward function
consists of two parts: 1) a positive gain for every step that does not
result in a crash (to enforce safe control) and 2) a negative gain
penalizing higher control inputs (to enforce smooth control):
r k = дp − дn δk2 ,

(3)

where дp = 10, дn = 0.05. A large negative reward of -100 is
received if the car crashes. Note that the negative input gain is not
applied in turns in order to avoid a local optimum while training.
2 All training, simulation and verification code is available at https://github.com/rivapp/

autonomous_car_verification.

Another hyper parameter in the training setup is the NN architecture. Although convolutional NNs are easier to train with highdimensional inputs, they are harder to verify by existing tools since
each convolutional layer needs to be unrolled in a fully connected
layer with a large number of neurons. Thus, we only consider fully
connected architectures in this case study. Scaling to convolutional
NNs is thus an important avenue for future work in NN verification.

5

VERIFICATION EVALUATION

Having described the NN controller training process, we now evaluate the scalability of a state-of-the-art verification tool, Verisig [15].
As mentioned in Section 1, the other existing tools cannot currently
handle the hybrid observation model. In the considered scenario,
the car starts from a 20cm-wide range in the middle of the hallway
(as illustrated in Figure 1) and runs for 7s. This is enough time for
the car to reach top speed before the first turn and to get roughly to
the middle of the next hallway. The safety property to be verified
is that the car is never within 0.3m of either wall.
Verisig focuses on NNs with smooth activations (i.e., sigmoid and
tanh) and works by transforming the NN into an equivalent hybrid
system. The NN’s hybrid system is composed with the plant’s hybrid
system, thereby casting the problem as a hybrid system verification
problem that is solved by Flow*. In Verisig’s original evaluation [15],
the tool scales to NNs with about 100 neurons per layer and a dozen
layers. The high-dimensional input space considered in this case
study, however, presents a greater challenge which might also affect
the tool’s scalability in terms of the NN size.
All NNs in this case study were trained with tanh activations.
The output layer also has a tanh activation, which is scaled by
15 so that the control input ranges from -15 to 15 degrees.3 As
described in Section 4, we use both the DDPG and TD3 algorithms
to explore different aspects of the verification process. All NNs have
3 The

dynamics model assumes the controls are given in radians – we use degrees in
the paper for clearer presentation.
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(a) DDPG, 64 × 64, controller 1.

(b) DDPG, 128 × 128, controller 2.
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(c) TD3, 64 × 64, controller 1.

(d) TD3, 128 × 128, controller 1.

Figure 3: Simulation traces for different NN controllers from Table 1.
subset size or could not be verified at all and for two NNs that were
LiDAR Scan in Unmodified Environment
verified with the original subset size of 0.5cm. The first two NNs
are very sensitive to their inputs and produce drastically different
traces depending on the initial condition. As shown in Section 6,
these NNs also result in unsafe behavior in the real world.

LiDAR Scan in Modified Environment
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Figure 4: LiDAR scans that led to crashes in experiments. Reflected rays appear as if no obstacles exist in that direction.
two hidden fully connected layers; the number of neurons per layer
is increased from 64 to 128. We also vary the number of LiDAR rays
from 21 to 41 and finally to 61 in order to evaluate the scalability in
terms of the input dimension as well.4 For repeatability purposes,
we train three controllers for each setup in the 21-ray case.
The verification times5 for all the setups are presented in Table 1, together with other verification artifacts. Note that the initial
interval is split in smaller subsets in order to maintain the approximation error small – the verification is performed separately for
each subset. For each setup, only average statistics over all subsets
are presented. As can be seen in the table, the biggest setup that
Verisig can handle has roughly 40 LiDAR rays. The verification
complexity in terms of the number of LiDAR rays is reflected in
the last column in the table, which indicates the average number
of paths in the hybrid observation model caused by the fact that
a LiDAR ray could potentially reach different walls – note that
smaller-NN setups can take longer to verify simply due to a higher
number of paths since each path needs to be verified separately.
A second important observation is that the NN verification time
is roughly 10% of the total verification time. This suggests that
plant verification remains a greatly challenging problem. Thus, the
scalability of verification needs to be greatly improved not only in
terms of the NN size but also in terms of the plant complexity.
Finally, the subset size indicates the difficulty of verifying a NN.
The subsets were decreased when the safety property could not be
verified due to high uncertainty (some NNs could not be verified
even with very small subsets). A smaller subset size means a NN is
less robust to input perturbations. As an illustration, Figure 3 shows
simulation traces for two NNs that either required reducing the
4 Note that, due to hardware issues with our LiDAR unit, we only used the rays ranging

from -115 to 115 degrees (instead of the full scan ranging from -135 to 135 degrees).
5 All experiments were run on a 80-core machine running at 1.2GHz. However, Flow*
is not parallelized, so the only benefit from the multicore processor is the fact that
multiple verification instances can be run at the same time.

Having evaluated the scalability of current verification tools, we
now investigate the benefits and limitations of verification w.r.t the
real system. The sim2real gap arises from imperfect (dynamics and
perception) models. While the dynamics model is fairly standard
(and worst-case error bounds could be obtained using model validation techniques [24]), the perception model is a major source
of uncertainty since surface reflectivity is unknown. Thus, when a
ray is reflected, it appears as if no obstacle exists in that direction.
We explore the sim2real gap in an environment that is identical to
the verified one in terms of hallway dimensions, the main difference
being that the real environment contains reflective surfaces that
sometimes greatly affect LiDAR measurements. To assess the quality
of the LiDAR model, we first measure its accuracy for non-reflected
rays. We collect multiple scans while keeping the car stationary
(with a known state) and compare the real data with the model’s
prediction. We observe that more than 90% of the non-reflected
rays are within 5cm of the model’s prediction (the bigger errors are
likely due to errors in measuring the car’s actual orientation).
In order to assess the effect of missing rays, we perform experiments in two settings: 1) an ideal environment in which most
reflective surfaces are covered and 2) the original unmodified environment.6 We perform 10 seven-second runs per NN setup in
each environment. All outcomes are reported in Table 2. As can be
seen in the table, roughly 10% of runs in the modified environment
were unsafe, uniformly spread across different NNs, thus indicating
that the LiDAR model is fairly accurate when no reflections occur
and that the verification result is strongly correlated with safe performance. We emphasize that LiDAR faults occurred even in this
environment – Figure 4a shows a LiDAR scan that caused a crash.
Table 2 also shows that more crashes were observed in the unmodified environment, due to multiple failing LiDAR rays (one scan
that led to a crash is shown in Figure 4b). Interestingly, it is possible
to produce similar behavior in simulations as well – Figure 5 shows
the same runs as those in Figure 3, but with five LiDAR rays randomly missing around the area of the turn, similar to the pattern
observed in Figure 4b. The behavior illustrated in Figure 5 is similar
6 All

data traces from the experiments are available at https://github.com/rivapp/
hscc20_data_traces.
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DRL algorithm NN architecture # LiDAR rays Controller Index Safe outcomes in Env M Safe outcomes in EnvU
DDPG
64 × 64
21
1
9/10
0/10
DDPG
64 × 64
21
2
9/10
2/10
DDPG
64 × 64
21
3
10/10
8/10
DDPG
128 × 128
21
1
10/10
8/10
DDPG
128 × 128
21
2
7/10
4/10
DDPG
128 × 128
21
3
9/10
0/10
TD3
64 × 64
21
1
8/10
9/10
TD3
64 × 64
21
2
10/10
9/10
TD3
64 × 64
21
3
10/10
9/10
TD3
128 × 128
21
1
9/10
9/10
TD3
128 × 128
21
2
9/10
5/10
TD3
128 × 128
21
3
9/10
9/10
Table 2: Sim2real gap for the 21-ray setups from Table 1. Ten runs were performed for each setup in both the modified (Env M )
and unmodified (EnvU ) environments. A safe outcome is recorded if the car does not hit a wall during a run.

(a) DDPG, 64×64, controller 1: 24%
safe.

(b) DDPG, 128 × 128, controller 2:
51% safe.

(c) TD3, 64 × 64, controller 1: 75%
safe.

(d) TD3, 128×128, controller 1: 83%
safe.

Figure 5: Simulation traces for the NN controllers from Figure 3, with LiDAR faults added around the corner.
to the real outcomes reported in Table 2, e.g., we observe multiple
the environment in order to develop an assume-guarantee approach
crashes for setups DDPG 64 × 64, controller 1, and DDPG 128 × 128,
such that verifying long traces may not be required.
controller 2, while the TD3 NNs are more robust to missing rays.
Verification scalability w.r.t. the NN. Quantifying scalability w.r.t.
the NN is not straightforward since a large, but smooth, NN may
6.1 Robust Reinforcement Learning
be easier to verify than a small, but sensitive, one, as indicated in
Although we can reproduce the LiDAR fault model, training a NN
Table 1. Yet, existing tools need to scale beyond a few hundred
that is robust to such faults was not possible with the DRL algoneurons in order to handle CNNs, which are much more effective
rithms used in the paper. While we did use established sim2real pracin high-dimensional settings. While there exist tools that can verify
tices (e.g., randomize initial conditions, add measurement noise [6]),
properties about convolutional NNs in isolation [29], achieving
the LiDAR fault model presents great robustness challenges since
such scalability in closed-loop systems remains an open problem,
the difference between a reflected and a non-reflected ray could be
partly due to the complexity of the plant model as well.
large. One potential solution is to use a different architecture, e.g.,
convolutional NNs (CNNs) or recurrent NNs which would add a
Robustness of DRL. Although DRL has seen great successes in
predictive aspect to the controller.
the last few years, it is still a challenge to train safe and robust
controllers, especially in high-dimensional problems. As shown
in Section 6, LiDAR faults can be reproduced fairly reliably in
7 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
simulation; yet, we could not train a robust controller using state-ofThis paper presented a challenging verification case study in which
the-art learning techniques. Thus, it is essential to develop methods
an autonomous racing car with a NN controller navigates a structhat focus on robustness and repeatability, with the final goal of
tured environment using LiDAR measurements only. We evaluated
being able to verify the robustness of the resulting controllers.
a state-of-the-art verification tool, Verisig, on this benchmark and
illustrated that current tools can handle only a small fraction of
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